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Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that de-
termines policy. This harms consumers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost
savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use
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1 Introduction
Sometimes firms comply with a regulation by gaming the measure targeted by policy, rather than
by changing their true behavior as intended. This relates to Goodhart’s Law, which posits that
“when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”1 We study how gaming of
this sort can impact consumers who rely on manipulable measures for making choices in a market.
Gaming erodes consumer information and induces mistakes. But, when the gaming is done in
reaction to a regulatory constraint, firms lower their costs by gaming, which benefits consumers
via pass through. The impact of gaming on consumer welfare is thus ambiguous, even when the
gaming completely fools consumers, and the net effect depends critically on whether or not gaming
is done in response to a policy.
This paper explores the impact of gaming on consumer welfare both theoretically and empirically
for the case of automobile fuel consumption ratings. We do three things in this paper. First, we use
a novel data set to measure on-road fuel consumption and document gaming of fuel consumption
ratings, which escalates dramatically following the introduction of regulations that target this
rating. Second, we develop a theoretical model that derives the impact of gaming on buyer welfare
in a setting where sellers game energy-efficiency ratings, which buyers use to evaluate products.
Third, we conduct welfare analysis using structural estimates of the automobile demand system to
quantify the welfare effects identified by our theory in calibrated simulations.
Our empirical analysis considers the introduction of stringent corrective policy in the EU au-
tomobile market. Prior to 2007, there were no policies in Europe that hinged directly on fuel
consumption ratings, but since then both EU-standards and nation-specific tax schemes have cre-
ated policy incentives that reward lower laboratory fuel consumption test ratings. To measure
gaming, we compare the laboratory ratings, which form the basis of policy, with direct measures
of on-road fuel consumption that we construct from a data set that tracks fuel consumption and
kilometers traveled for a panel of more than 250,000 drivers over twelve years in the Netherlands.
Using these data, we estimate the percentage difference between the laboratory test and on-road
performance, which we call the performance gap, for each vehicle vintage and model.
We document a sharp rise in the performance gap coincident with policy change. Vehicles
produced before 2007 show a small, and relatively stable, performance gap. Vehicles produced after
that exhibit a large and rising performance gap, so that 2014 model year vehicles have performance
gaps in excess of 50% on average. These results are robust to a number of specification checks and
various controls and are similar for all automakers. The rise in the performance gap implies that
around 65% of the gains in fuel economy since the introduction of policy, as measured by laboratory
tests, are false. Using conventional estimates of lifetime distance traveled and a social cost of carbon
of $40 per ton of carbon, the difference between apparent and actual emissions reductions amounts
to $1.2 billion annually from 2010 to 2014 when extrapolated to all of Europe. We interpret the
rise in the performance gap as evidence of gaming in response to policy incentives, in the spirit
1Goodhart’s original concern was monetary policy (Goodhart 1981). A similar notion, also focused on monetary
policy, is captured in the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976).
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of Goodhart’s Law, and then turn our attention to our central question—who benefits when firms
game corrective policy?—both theoretically and in welfare simulations.
Our theoretical model considers a monopolist who sells a good to a representative consumer.
The good has some attribute that is desirable to consumers, but it also creates a negative externality
that motivates corrective policy. The attribute closely matches the role of fuel economy ratings in
the automobile market.2 The attribute is not directly observable, however, so consumer demand
and government regulation are based on a measure provided by the seller. The seller can change
the measure either by changing the true attribute or by gaming, both of which are costly.
In our model, we allow that some fraction of gaming is undetected by buyers. In the absence of
policy, this means that gaming lowers buyer welfare for two reasons. First, gaming causes buyers to
mis-optimize (choose the wrong quantity of the good), which leads to a loss in buyer surplus that
we call choice distortion.3 Second, gaming causes the seller to raise price because buyers perceive
an improvement in the product. This price effect further reduces buyer surplus.
Corrective policy disrupts this logic by flipping the sign of price effects. Regulation raises the
cost of production. Gaming allows the seller to lower its costs, and this benefits buyers through
lower prices in the same way that a reduction in a tax would. When this price effect dominates
choice distortions from faulty information, buyers benefit from the seller’s gaming, even when they
are fooled by it. We believe that our identification of these two competing effects, which highlights
how the impact of gaming hinges on the existence of policy, is unique to the literature on gaming.
Throughout the paper we focus on buyer surplus as a notion of the private surplus of consumers
that consider buying the good. This is narrower than consumer surplus which would encompass
the externality. We focus on incidence and thus on buyer surplus, but gaming will also impact the
level of the externality. The ultimate effect of gaming on the environment will turn on the degree
of sophistication of the policymaker, who may increasingly tighten policy to achieve real gains, and
of the buyers, who may expand the overall size of the market when they mistakenly perceive lower
costs of ownership.
Next, we set out to quantify the price effect and choice distortions in our empirical setting.
We demonstrate that the price effects and choice distortions identified by our theory have direct
empirical analogs in a discrete choice setting. We then estimate a demand model of the European
car market that provides us estimates of consumer preferences and the marginal costs of products.
Given these preferences and costs we calibrate the incidence of gaming for a range of alternative
assumptions regarding consumer awareness, policy stringency, and the degree of gaming.
We find robust results that align with our theoretical predictions. When there is no corrective
2In the automobile market, fuel economy is a characteristic valued by buyers, and it is directly linked to an
externality (carbon emissions). In terms of the model, fuel economy ratings, which are isomorphic to carbon emissions
ratings, are the true attribute. But, true on-road fuel economy is observed by neither car buyers nor the regulator.
Instead, regulations and consumer-facing fuel economy labels are based on laboratory tests. Firms can improve a
test result either by increasing a vehicle’s true fuel economy or by gaming the test.
3The choice distortion that we identify is conceptually identical to the consumer surplus loss due to cognitive
frictions or information limitations in several prior papers, including Leggett (2002), Allcott (2013), Sallee (2014) and
Dubois, Griffith, and O’Connell (2018).
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policy and when consumers are fooled by gaming, we find that lowering perceived fuel costs through
gaming leads to modest losses in buyer surplus. A significant majority of these losses come through
the price effect. As a result, firm profits rise with gaming, and this comes at the expense of lower
buyer surplus.
As suggested by the theory, the welfare effects of gaming change when we introduce a corrective
policy. We model a mandated decrease in average fuel consumption ratings that firms comply
with via shifting their sales mix towards more efficient models. When firms comply honestly,
private consumer surplus falls substantially, as consumers are forced into less desirable products.
When we allow firms to relax this regulatory constraint by gaming to meet the standard, we find
beneficial price effects for buyers that consistently dominate choice distortions so that the net
impact of gaming is to raise buyer surplus. Gaming with or without a policy induces a similar sized
choice distortion, but we find that this is an order of magnitude smaller than the price effect for a
significant range of parameter choices. These results provide empirical validation for our theoretical
prediction: gaming benefits consumers in the presence of stringent policy, even when buyers are
fooled. We also show that a corrective policy roughly triples the private benefit to a single firm
that games when all others are honest, which implies that policy amplifies competitive pressures
that incentivize gaming.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, our finding that carmakers game test ratings in
response to fuel economy standards contributes to a large literature that seeks to evaluate welfare
implications from fuel economy standards.4 Recent articles have pointed out new concerns about
the efficiency of fuel economy standards due to interactions with the used car market (Jacobsen
and van Benthem 2015), safety (Jacobsen 2013, Bento, Gillingham, and Roth 2017), unintended
consequences of attribute basing (Ito and Sallee Forthcoming, Whitefoot and Skerlos 2012), and
heterogeneity in vehicle lifetimes (Jacobsen, Knittel, Sallee, and van Benthem 2016). We add to
that literature by pointing out the importance of rating accuracy and gaming. Our findings reveal
that concerns about gaming prove to be yet another inefficiency of fuel economy standards. Note
that our focus is on establishing the incidence of gaming, not on providing a policy evaluation of
the EU fuel economy standard. For such an evaluation, see Reynaert (2017), which shows that the
standard has induced firms to abate emissions with a mixture of technology adoption and gaming.
The broader second contribution is that we bridge two separate literatures, one on the effects
of gaming on market outcomes, and the other on the incidence of externality-correcting policies.
In brief, the gaming literature has considered what we call the choice distortion, and the policy
evaluation literature has considered what we call price effects. We combine these in our theory
model and then determine which one dominates in our empirical analysis.
A theoretical literature on gaming has considered how gaming can impact market outcomes in
a variety of models (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson 2006, Heidhues, Ko˝szegi, and Murooka 2017, Frankel
4Key studies in this literature include Goldberg (1998), Austin and Dinan (2005), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and
von Haefen (2009), Anderson and Sallee (2011), Klier and Linn (2012), Jacobsen (2013), Gillingham (2013), Parry,
Evans, and Oates (2014), Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017), and Durrmeyer and Samano (Forthcoming). See
Anderson and Sallee (2016) for a recent review.
3
and Kartik Forthcoming), but to the best of our knowledge, only Rhodes and Wilson (Forthcoming)
and Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2015) consider gaming in the context of regulatory enforcement.
In contrast to Rhodes and Wilson (Forthcoming), we consider gaming in response to externality-
correcting policy when strong enforcement is lacking. In contrast to Drugov and Troya-Martinez
(2015), we include endogenous prices for the good. Empirically, there are a number of papers
that show how market measures can be manipulated so as to create market distortions, including
test scores (Dee, Dobbie, Jacob, and Rockoff 2016), mortgage markets (Ben-David 2011, Jiang,
Nelso, and Vytlacil 2014), or corporate earnings (Roychowdhury 2006). None of these weigh the
competing effects of information-based losses and positive price effects on buyer surplus, which is
our focus.
On the other hand, many papers have analyzed the incidence of externality-correcting policies,
showing, for example, how the costs of complying with environmental regulations are passed through
into product prices (Jacobsen 2013), energy prices (Fabra and Reguant 2014), or labor earnings
(Walker 2013). We study the flip side of this coin, which is how cost savings from regulatory
avoidance can pass through to buyers of a regulated good. We add to that literature by integrating
the welfare implications of information erosion into incidence analysis.
Third, we also contribute to a strain of environmental economics that studies compliance and
enforcement issues.5 Environmental economics often cites ease of enforcement and compliance
differences as a reason to prefer some instruments over others (e.g., Goulder and Parry 2008). We
point out differences in the incidence of alternative instruments (e.g., fuel economy standards versus
a gasoline tax) that arise from gaming, which can break the irrelevance of statutory incidence in
determining economic incidence. Our point about statutory incidence is also made in Slemrod
(2008) and Kopczuk, Marion, Muehlegger, and Slemrod (2016), though those papers do not discuss
externality correction.
Fourth, our analysis is also relevant to the specific issue of emissions testing reliability, which has
become a major policy topic in the wake of the Volkswagen emissions testing scandal. Our reduced-
form estimates of the degree of gaming are consistent with a growing set of media accounts, with
analysis performed by the International Council for Clean Transportation, which has documented a
similar gap in a number of European countries (The International Council on Clean Transportation
2014, 2015), and with quasi-experimental evidence on fuel consumption gaming in Japan (Tanaka
2017).6 We add further evidence of gaming to that body of work, and also introduce the first
analysis of how emissions test gaming impacts the private welfare of car buyers. Our detection of
gaming via the comparison of two data sets adds to a related tradition in forensic economics (see
Zitzewitz (2012) for a review).
5See Gray and Shimshack (2011) and Sigman (2012) for reviews, and Duflo, Greenstone, and Ryan (2013), Oliva
(2015) and Sanders and Sandler (2017) for related examples.
6The ICCT reports include analysis of the Netherlands based on the same data that we use here. Our results are
broadly similar, but our analysis contributes by providing an independent academic analysis and through a number of
methodological improvements, including the calculation of standard errors, the introduction of time of driving fixed
effects and other controls, a variance decomposition, an Empirical Bayes correction, and extrapolation to the entire
European market through matching.
4
Finally, recent research has documented a failure of energy efficiency programs to realize ex ante
expected savings in appliances (Davis, Fuchs, and Gertler 2014) and buildings (Fowlie, Greenstone,
and Wolfram Forthcoming, Levinson 2016). We provide related evidence of a lack of efficacy in
energy-efficiency policies for automobiles, which have delivered only a fraction of expected savings
because of gaming.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with our reduced form analysis of the performance
gap in section 2. In section 3 we describe our theoretical model, which delineates choice distortions
and price effects. Section 4 estimates a structural model of the automobile market and uses the
estimates to calculate changes in consumer surplus due to choice distortions and price effects from
gaming in our calibrated simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Automakers game EU fuel consumption ratings
In this section we discuss Goodhart’s Law in the EU automobile market. We document a sharp
decrease in the correlation between official and on-road fuel consumption ratings that coincides
with those ratings becoming subject to regulation. We start by describing policy changes in the
EU automobile market and detailing how carmakers report official fuel consumption ratings. We
then describe data from a large sample of drivers in the Netherlands that we use to construct
estimates of on-road consumption. Finally, we quantify the gap between official ratings and on-
road consumption and relate that pattern to the rollout of policy.
2.1 European fuel economy regulations are relatively new
Prior to 2007, automobiles in Europe were not subject to explicit regulation based on their car-
bon emissions. Since then, automobiles have become subject to both an EU-wide regulation and
nation-specific tax and subsidy schemes that are explicitly tied to carbon emissions. The EU-
wide regulation mandates that automakers sell vehicles that have a sales-weighted average carbon
emission rate below a certain level. A vehicle’s carbon emission rate is measured as a linear trans-
formation (to convert units) of fuel consumption, which itself is just the inverse of fuel economy.
Thus, while the EU policy is described as regulating carbon, it is directly analogous to the US
Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, which are described as regulating fuel economy.
Prior to 2007, there was no legally binding fuel economy regulation in Europe. The standard was
announced in 2007, passed into law in its final form in 2009, and phased in over several subsequent
years. The first year of enforcement was 2012, with a ramp-up in the standard taking place from
2012 to 2015. Fully phased-in, the regulation is quite aggressive by historical and international
standards. Fines for non-compliance are stiff. When the standard was announced, if automakers
had left their fleets unchanged, they would have faced an average fine of 1,250 euros per vehicle.
In addition to the EU standard, all member states have separate tax schemes for new vehicles.
During the rollout of the EU-wide regulation, many member states adjusted their national policies so
that tax schemes were based explicitly on carbon emission rates. France introduced a feebate, which
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taxes heavily-polluting cars and subsidizes cleaner models, in 2008. In 2009, Germany switched
its annual road taxes so that they depend on carbon emissions rates, rather than engine cylinders.
In 2008, Spain introduced registration taxes that depend on emissions ratings. The Netherlands
did the same in 2010. Gerlagh, van den Bijgaart, Nijland, and Michielsen (Forthcoming) present a
detailed overview of the move towards carbon taxation in EU member states after 2007.
2.2 How are fuel economy ratings measured?
Carbon emissions ratings for all of these policies are based on a laboratory test, called the New
European Driving Cycle (NEDC). This test procedure, which is conducted by third-party facili-
ties that are funded by the automakers, measures fuel consumption in liters per 100 kilometers
(L/100km). A test vehicle is put onto a chassis dynamometer (a treadmill for cars), and a pro-
fessional driver “drives” the car through a specified series of speeds and accelerations. Emissions
are captured directly from the tailpipe and used to determine gaseous outputs, which are used to
determine fuel consumption. Two different test cycles are run to simulate city and highway driving.
A coast down test is also performed to measure aerodynamics.
The NEDC is not only the basis of CO2 regulation, but also consumer-facing labels and emis-
sions limits on local air pollutants, such as NOX , PM and CO. The test procedure captures local
pollutants and measures their quantities to determine vehicle compliance with emissions limits. In
terms of consumer information, the NEDC rating is the rating that automakers are required to use
in consumer advertising, and it is the rating that appears on mandatory energy efficiency labels for
new vehicles. As such, the NEDC was used as a regulatory and market instrument for roughly a
decade before the rollout of carbon regulation.
We are interested in how automakers might game this test. Tests are performed in third-party
facilities, but these are funded by the automakers and may not have incentive to maintain test
integrity. According to media and industry accounts, the European test procedure offers the tester
considerable “flexibility” in test procedures.7 For example, automakers are not expressly prohibited
from submitting test vehicles that have been modified. Firms remove optional equipment, thereby
changing the weight of the vehicle to improve performance. They also tape down seams in the
vehicle, remove side mirrors and roof racks, and over-inflate tires to improve results of the coast
down test. Alternatively, automakers may install technologies that perform particularly well on the
test cycle, or they could even calibrate an engine to perform in a particularly efficient way during
the highly specific test cycle’s series of speeds and accelerations.8 To detect gaming, we compare
laboratory test ratings with a direct measure of on-road fuel consumption, which we describe next.
7For example, see “Europe’s Auto Makers Keep Test Firms Close” in the March 21, 2016 Wall Street Journal :
http://on.wsj.com/1o5h47B.
8These “flexibilities” differ significantly from analogous tests in the US, where the law is much more explicit about
the details of the test vehicle and test procedures.
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2.3 On-road fuel consumption data
We obtained data from TravelCard NV, a company providing fuel services in the Netherlands. These
panel data contain information on 66 million fuel station visits from drivers using a TravelCard NV
card between January 2004 and May 2015. Most of the individuals in this sample drive a vehicle
provided to them by their employer, who also pays directly for fuel. This implies that we have a
selected sample, though the provision of a company car is quite common in the Netherlands due to
tax advantages and the high cost of personal vehicle ownership. Nearly half of new vehicles sold in
the Netherlands are registered as company cars (Booz & Company 2012).
When visiting a fuel station, Travelcard NV users swipe a smart card to pay for fuel. When
a driver swipes her card we observe the drivers’ license plate and the date, time and location of
the fuel station visit. We also observe the exact amount and the type of fuel purchased and a self-
reported odometer reading at the time of fueling. Regarding the latter, drivers are asked to enter
their current odometer reading into the fuel pump’s keypad during the transaction. Transactions
are linked to an account, which is a unique combination of a driver with a particular vehicle, which
corresponds to a unique license plate. Unfortunately, if the same individual drives one vehicle for
some time and then switches to another vehicle, we have no way of linking those data and must
treat them as separate accounts. We refer to this panel variable as a driver, which should be
understood as a unique combination of a driver with a particular vehicle.
TravelCard NV provides us with a second dataset that matches each license plate with the
vehicle brand, model name, weight, fuel type and the official fuel consumption rating of the vehicle.
These characteristics allow us to match the Dutch data with a panel on European car sales and
prices from 1998-2011 used in Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven (Forthcoming) and Reynaert
(2017). We match each vehicle to sales volume, list price and a broader set of characteristics,
including length, width and several engine characteristics.
Odometer readings are self-reported and many individual entries are unreliable. In appendix A.1
we detail steps we take to purge unreliable entries. Our final sample includes 24 million transactions.
These data include over 2,500 unique types of cars driven by 266,000 different drivers. A car type
is defined as a unique combination of brand (Volkswagen), model name (Golf), fuel type (Diesel)
and official fuel consumption. We define the release year for a car type as the first time we observe
a unique combination of these variables in the data between 1998 and 2014.
Table A.1, in the appendix, gives summary statistics for the raw data. The average vehicle in
our sample has a fuel consumption of 6.65 L/100km and a weight of 1,354kg. Somewhat less than
half of the vehicles (46%) have diesel engines. We observe an average of 107 drivers per car with
a maximum of 3,228 drivers. For each of these drivers we observe an average of 134 visits to the
pump with a maximum of 1,135. Driver mean total consumption is 6,015 liters of fuel purchased
corresponding to 111,726 km travelled. Finally, the average fuel station visit involves 45 liters of
fuel purchased, corresponding to an odometer increase of 671 km with a standard deviation of 192
km.
Our sample is drawn from company cars, but our data provide estimates that characterize a
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majority of the market. In appendix Table A.2, we show that vehicles in the Travelcard data are
cheaper, lighter, more fuel efficient and more likely to be a diesel than the average new vehicle
in the Netherlands. One explanation of the difference is that our data contain almost no luxury
vehicles or sports cars. Also, company cars are driven more than the average household car, which
likely explains the higher share of diesels in our sample.
Nevertheless, the models in our final sample are the models that account for 76% of all sales in
the Netherlands. Moreover, the Dutch car market is very similar to the entire EU market; it features
a mix of French, German and foreign brands that is very similar to the EU average. Thus, our
data provide estimates of on-road performance that cover the broader market fairly well. However,
we wish to stress that we have no way of directly assessing whether drivers of company cars drive
their vehicles differently, and thereby exhibit a different performance gap, than the average Dutch
driver. Fortunately, we are focused on changes in the performance gap over time, so as long as
differences between company car drivers and other drivers are stable over time, this will not be a
major concern for our conclusions.
2.4 On-road fuel consumption and the performance gap
We construct a measure of on-road fuel consumption rnij for each pump visit n of driver i in car j
as the ratio of the liters purchased and the change in reported odometer between the visit and the
previous visit:
rnij =
litersn
odometern − odometern−1 ∗ 100. (1)
This measure of on-road fuel consumption, in units of L/100km, will vary between pump visits of
a driver for three reasons. First, variable driving conditions such as outside temperature, route
choice, driving style and congestion will differ across observations. Second, the driver may over or
understate the odometer reading. We are not aware of any incentive for the drivers to deliberately
misreport distance traveled, but from the data it is obvious that there are many mistakes. Third,
there might be variability due to stockpiling effects. If the consumer does not always fill the tank
of the vehicle completely there will be variation in rnij . If a driver visits the fuel station with an
empty tank and fills half of it we will observe a very low fuel consumption for visit n and a higher
fuel consumption for the next visit if she refills the tank completely.
Next, we construct the percentage gap between on-road and tested fuel consumption as:
dnij =
rnij − lij
lij
, (2)
in which the official rating lij is constant for each car j and the on-road rating varies across
observations. We call this the performance gap. We are interested in estimating the mean and
variance of dj , defined as the average dnij across n and i for a given vehicle type j. In particular,
we are interested in the mean and variance of dj across vehicle types from the same vintage (release
year). We now discuss this performance gap by presenting its evolution over time, by estimating a
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Figure 1: On-road and official fuel consumption per release year
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fixed effects model and by analyzing heterogeniety in the gaps over time.
2.5 The mean performance gap rises over time
Figure 1 plots the mean official rating lij , the mean on-road rating rnij and the percentage-gap
dnij for each release year. Between 1998 and 2006 we see that both official fuel consumption and
on-road consumption vary between 6.1 and 7.5 L/100km. The percentage gap fluctuates between
12% and 20% and shows evidence of a slight upward trend after 2004. From 2006 onward we see a
spectacular drop in official consumption from 6.2 to less than 4 L/100km. This translates to a rise
from the already high value of 38 mpg in 2004 to a truly remarkable 67 mpg in 2014. Official fuel
consumption decreases by almost 50% over the sample period.
The on-road ratings follow a trend similar to the official ratings up until 2008. After 2008
the on-road fuel consumption decreases much more slowly than the official rating, going from
6.5 to 5.9 L/100km. As a result, the percentage gap between the official and on-road ratings
increases dramatically: from around 12% at the beginning of the sample to almost 55% by 2014.
This divergence is remarkable in magnitude, and it coincides exactly with the new EU-wide fuel
consumption regulation, which was announced in 2007, finalized in 2009, and phased-in over the
remainder of the sample, as well as the phase-in of national policies described above.
The divergence in test ratings and on-road performance is not isolated to a particular automaker.
Figure 2 plots the estimated mean gap dnij for three sets of model years (early, middle and late)
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Figure 2: Gap between on-road and official fuel consumption per firm
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Figure shows estimated coefficients and standard errors from regressing the performance gap on three sets of model
release years (early, middle and late) per automaker, the data is restricted to the ten brands with most observations.
separately for each automaker. All automakers show a substantial increase in the gap over time,
and all show an economically important gap in the later years. The performance gap is a global
phenomenon: the three largest gaps are for a European firm (Renault), a Japanese firm (Toyota),
and an American firm (Ford).
2.6 The trend in the performance gap is robust to controls
To account for various potential confounders, we next estimate the performance gap through a
series of regressions on our microdata that take the following form:
dnij = RELEASEj + FUELj +MODELj + Y EARn +MONTHn + nij ,
where RELEASEj are release year (i.e., vintage) dummies; FUELj is a dummy for diesel engines;
MODELj are model dummy variables; and Y EARn and MONTHn are time fixed effects for year
and month, specific to the observed station visit.
We interpret the release year dummy coefficients as average measures of the performance gap
for each vintage. These are our coefficients of interest. The omitted category is vehicles that are
present in the first year of our data, which implies that they were released in 1998 or before.
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If some vehicle types have a bigger gap than others, then our time trend could reflect composi-
tional changes. Therefore, we add a fuel type dummy for diesel and vehicle model name dummies
to control for compositional changes in the car market over time. Controlling for model dummies,
which is more aggregate than our vehicle type j (e.g., a Toyota Camry is a model, whereas a
2010 Toyota Camry with 2.0L engine is a vehicle type), isolates variation between different engine
releases over time (across vintages) of the same model.
Year and month of driving dummies control for driving conditions that change over time and
over months in a year. These time controls account for changes in driving behavior, sample selection
and other factors such as fuel prices that vary over time by including time of driving fixed effects.
For example, we observe both a 2008 and 2009 vehicle type being driving in 2010, and so we can
estimate vintage effects (2008 versus 2009) while controlling for time of driving (2010).
Also, we observe later year vintages disproportionately in later years, so changes over time in
congestion, driving patterns, or fuel prices could potentially bias our results if we omit time of
driving controls.
Figure 3 plots the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals (with clustering on vehicle
type j) from two regressions with individual refueling transactions as the unit of observation. In
the first regression (red markers) we estimate the percentage-gap dnij as the coefficients on release
year dummies. The second regression (blue markers) adds the controls for time of driving and
model fixed effects. This shows that the introduction of controls has little impact on our results,
which suggests that compositional changes or changes in driving conditions do not explain the time
trend. The same coefficients are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.9
Our interpretation of this time trend in the performance gap is that the accuracy of official
fuel consumption ratings declines over time, due to the introduction of European fuel economy
regulations. In Table 1 we show evidence that weighs against several alternative explanations.
First, we consider the role of a rebound effect. If more recent vintages are more fuel efficient,
consumers may respond by driving less carefully or using temperature controls or other equipment
more often. In this case, reduced average fuel consumption rates will lead to an increasing gap.
One might expect the same mechanism to create a significant difference in the gap between gasoline
and diesel powered vehicles, as diesel vehicles are about 30% more energy efficient. If the rebound
effect were a major driver of the performance gap, we would expect to see a bigger gap among
diesels that grows more quickly. We estimate the release year fixed effects separately for gasoline
and diesel engines in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1, and find no such pattern. There is initially
no difference in the gap between diesels and gasoline vehicles, in some years diesels have a larger
performance gap, while in other years the reverse is true.
Second, one might be concerned that fuel consumption differs with the age of the car. One might
expect older cars to become less fuel efficient, leading to an overestimate of the earlier release year
dummies. There could also be sample selection, however, such that cars with good on-road fuel
9Note that the R2 for the model without controls is .28, which suggests that release years explain an impressive
fraction of the variation, given that the unit of observation here is an individual fuel transaction.
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Table 1: Release year fixed effects from regression of performance gap on controls
All Controls Gasoline Diesel 1st Year Long
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 11.69 13.59 11.44 11.94 10.28 7.80
(0.66) (0.60) (0.67) (1.13) (1.39) (0.61)
1999 2.00 0.50 0.96 2.33 2.45
(1.45) (0.88) (1.10) (2.10) (1.29)
2000 0.32 0.73 0.13 0.40 0.38
(0.88) (0.73) (1.21) (1.33) (0.88)
2001 2.33 -0.20 2.08 2.40 2.70
(0.98) (0.96) (1.16) (1.50) (1.02)
2002 1.77 1.28 2.40 1.33 1.48
(1.56) (1.07) (1.50) (2.32) (1.48)
2003 2.46 1.35 3.79 1.16 1.49
(1.32) (0.80) (1.60) (2.03) (1.46)
2004 3.30 2.60 3.93 2.80 1.24
(1.41) (0.78) (2.69) (1.56) (1.33)
2005 4.71 4.29 8.55 2.54 2.50 3.60
(1.43) (0.97) (1.84) (1.99) (2.39) (1.25)
2006 10.59 3.93 14.71 3.40 5.80 7.57
(5.09) (1.08) (5.96) (1.67) (1.73) (4.52)
2007 7.38 8.55 10.75 5.02 2.79 6.02
(1.39) (1.04) (1.50) (1.92) (2.09) (1.21)
2008 9.53 9.00 10.78 8.53 12.60 6.21
(1.37) (1.00) (1.09) (2.33) (2.47) (1.20)
2009 18.50 13.92 19.14 17.61 15.66 13.65
(2.24) (1.42) (2.94) (3.18) (2.21) (1.89)
2010 22.57 18.13 16.85 25.36 19.85 18.17
(2.10) (1.43) (1.42) (2.80) (2.09) (2.11)
2011 23.43 18.54 23.10 23.54 23.28 18.29
(1.57) (1.11) (3.64) (1.42) (2.10) (1.24)
2012 35.16 28.81 27.51 40.81 36.96 29.55
(2.95) (2.07) (2.17) (2.52) (4.38) (2.94)
2013 41.24 36.06 35.26 43.38 43.16 38.58
(1.89) (1.64) (1.97) (1.90) (2.48) (1.80)
2014 42.68 40.92 39.98 48.99 41.50 46.25
(2.47) (3.49) (1.69) (2.46) (2.52) (3.84)
Year/Month F.E. Yes
Fueltype Yes
Model F.E. Yes
#Obs. (*106) 23.98 23.98 10.17 13.81 0.91 0.24
R2 0.28 0.40 0.21 0.36 0.26 0.35
Table reports coefficients from a regression of the performance gap (dnij) on release year
fixed effects. The unit of observation is an individual refueling transaction. Standard
errors clustered by car type in parentheses. Columns vary as follows: (1) contains all
data, (2) all the data with year and month, fuel type and vehicle model fixed effects, (3)
only gasoline engines, (4) only diesel engines, (5) keeps observations only in the first year
of driving (6) dependent variable is long difference between first and last observation for
each driver instead of differences between visits.
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Figure 3: Release year coefficients from fixed effect regressions
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Figure plots coefficients from a regression of the performance gap (dnij) on release year fixed effects. Coefficients
correspond to regressions (1) and (2) from Table 1.
economy stay in our sample longer creating bias in the other direction. To control for this we keep
only observations of dnij that take place in the release year of the vehicle, so that we are capturing
fuel consumption gaps only among the newest cars. Note that we are observing driving only from
2004 onwards, so we can only estimate on-road performance from vintages starting in 2004 in this
specification. Column (5) reports those results. They show the same stark increase in the gap
towards the end of the sample, which suggests that age effects are not driving our findings.
Finally, taking long differences, instead of differences between fuel station visits, might be more
robust to bias from reporting errors and stockpiling. The drawback is that it does not allow us to
control for time of driving effects in the regressions. Column (6) shows that our findings are robust:
we get nearly identical estimates when we use long differences, taken between the last and first fuel
station visit for each driver.
In sum, we conclude that the increase over time in the performance gap is robust to changes
in fuel prices or congestion over time, to composition of the fleet, to rebound effects, to aging or
selection over time, and to bias from stockpiling or reporting errors.
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2.7 Heterogeneity in the performance gap does not rise over time
The welfare effects of gaming that we explore in the remainder of the paper potentially depend on
whether there is significant heterogeneity in gaming within a release year across vehicle types.
To study potential heterogeneity in gaming at the vehicle level we need vehicle level estimates
of the performance gap. In obtaining these estimates we want to take into account the underlying
data quality for each vehicle controlling for the large variance in reported odometer readings, and
the variation in the number of drivers and visits observed for different types of cars. Therefore,
we follow the teacher value added literature, specifically Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) and
Kane and Staiger (2008), to estimate on-road fuel consumption rj using precision weights and an
empirical Bayes correction. We construct a precision-weighted mean of rj and shrink it according
to the reliability of the observations for j. Because of the measurement error in rnij it is optimal,
from a prediction standpoint, to use a biased but more precise estimate of each vehicle gap.10 The
empirical Bayes procedure and accompanying variance decomposition is discussed in Appendix A.2.
Figure 4 plots the quartiles of the estimated Bayes corrected gaps for all release years as well
as the standard deviation of the estimated fixed effects. Again we see a clear increase in the
estimated gap over time, but perhaps surprisingly, this increase in the gap is not associated with
a large change in the dispersion of the gap. If firms intensively game only some of their models,
we would expect a rise in average gaming to correspond to a greater interquartile spread or larger
standard deviation, across model types within a vintage. Figure 4 shows, however, that these
measures of dispersion did not rise over time. Instead, the data suggest that we should think about
gaming in the EU market as an industry-wide shift, rather than a shift among select vehicles. This
pattern is consistent with the underlying economics of gaming. Because the regulation is based
on fleet averages, automakers have an incentive to game all of their vehicles, not just those with
high consumption ratings. Moreover, to the extent that gaming consists largely of modifying test
vehicles, the costs of gaming are largely a fixed cost, and it is plausible that techniques developed
to game the test vehicle for one model line can be used for most other models.
2.8 Summary of reduced-form evidence
We conclude from this empirical section that there is very strong evidence of substantial gaming
of fuel consumption ratings. Depending on our estimation method, the performance gap between
on-road consumption and official test ratings varies between 10% to 15% before regulation. By 2012
this gap had increased to 30%, and all specifications estimate a mean gap of more than 45% in
2014. We have not found a single robustness check where this spectacular increase in the gap does
not occur. Our findings regarding the time path of the performance gap is consistent with analysis
performed by the International Council for Clean Transportation (The International Council on
10Note that this approach does not allow us to control for selection issues where drivers with different performance
gaps select into different type of vehicles. Correlations between driving style and vehicle selection could influence
our results, but again we emphasize our focus on changes in the performance gap over time, which mitigates these
concerns.
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Figure 4: Distribution of vehicle level fixed effects
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Clean Transportation 2014, 2015).11 Relative to those reports, we demonstrate robustness to
the inclusion of various controls (most notably time period fixed effects), include standard errors,
develop an empirical Bayes correction for sampling error, and calculate the distribution of the
vehicle-level performance gap. Regarding the latter, this yields the striking and perhaps surprising
finding that the gap is increasing for all vehicles and brands in the sample, so that the distribution
of the gap is shifting, but the shape is relatively constant.
We see the decrease in the correlation between official and on-road ratings at a time when
stakes on official ratings increase as a manifestation of Goodhart’s law. In the remainder of the
paper, we interpret this time trend as evidence that automakers gamed official ratings in response
to new regulations. We recognize that this evidence is suggestive, but we cannot think of any
plausible alternative explanation.12 While the EU commission has released an external evaluation
of the emission standard, the official ratings are still the basis for the evaluation of the program
and external communications about the program’s impact.13 Analysts who perform cost-benefit
11The ICCT reports results from various sources including the data from Travelcard NV we obtained. The other
sources include consumer self-reports uploaded to websites and consumer car testing magazines. The data from
Travelcard are by far the most extensive in terms of number of vehicles and drivers included, but it is reassuring that
all data in the ICCT reports point to very similar results.
12Tanaka (2017) shows quasi-experimental evidence on fuel consumption gaming in Japan. The Japanese standard
specifies discrete notches, rather than a sales-weighted average as in our case, allowing for a comparison in gaps below
and above a notch.
13See for example http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars, read on 09/13/2016.
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analyses of the regulation may significantly mis-evaluate the program if they calculate savings based
on official ratings.
We now turn our attention to our main economic question—who benefits from this gaming?
Carmakers game the official rating to avoid stringent regulation, lowering compliance costs of the
carmakers. Consumers will benefit from gaming to the extent these cost savings are passed through.
But, these official ratings are also used by consumers when deciding what vehicle to buy. As a result,
the manipulation of fuel consumption ratings alters the information value of the rating, which may
distort consumer choice. Because of this, the incidence of the gaming in this market is ambiguous.
We now set out to understand the incidence of gaming in response to corrective policy, when the
policy measure has an information role in the market, beginning first with a model and then a
calibrated market simulation.
3 A model of gaming
The goal of our model is to describe the impact of gaming on buyer welfare, taking into account
how prices will depend on gaming, the presence of a policy, and the degree to which buyers are
fooled by the gaming.
3.1 Setup
We model the market for a good that has a mutable attribute x that generates private value to
buyers and also creates a social externality. In the automobile example, x is the vehicle’s fuel
consumption rating. The full cost of the good is denoted f = p + βx, where p is the up-front
purchase price and β is a coefficient that translates fuel consumption ratings into dollars.14 Note
that x is a bad. We suppose that the good is sold by a monopoly seller, but the basic insights of
our model do not depend on the form of competition. For simplicity, we assume that all attributes
of a good are fixed other than x and p; this can be interpreted as a short-run assumption.
Buyers do not observe x directly, but instead receive a message m from the seller (i.e., the official
fuel consumption rating that appears on labels). Gaming occurs when the seller sends a message
m that differs from x, where gaming g is defined as the difference between the true attribute and
the message (g = x−m). Under full information, buyer demand D for the product depends on its
various attributes (held fixed and thus suppressed in notation) and lifetime cost, which depends on
x and p: D(f) = D(p+ βx). Buyers, however, observe m not x, so they use the observed signal to
form beliefs, labeled x˜, where f˜ = p+ βx˜. We assume risk neutrality.
Buyer beliefs x˜ are assumed to be a weighted average of the truth and the signal:
x˜t = αx+ (1− α)(x− g) = x− (1− α)g.
14For a vehicle, β is the price of fuel per liter times the number of present discounted lifetime kilometers driven,
while x is the L/100km rating.
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This is a tractable form of beliefs that encompasses a variety of possibilities. When α = 1, buyers
can see through gaming completely. When α = 0, buyers are completely fooled. For intermediate
cases, (1−α) represents the extent to which the buyer is fooled by gaming. The key for our purpose
is that we want to allow the possibility that firms can fool buyers, to some degree. This specification
is appealing in part because, for all of our results, we will be able to see how the effects differ when
buyers are not fooled just by setting α = 1.
Changing x or g incurs a cost. We assume that these costs are separable, and that changing
x determines marginal cost, while changing g incurs a fixed cost. These assumptions about cost,
which are convenient but not essential, are made in line with the market we study. Gaming is
reported to be achieved largely through manipulation of the test vehicle, while real fuel consumption
improvements require marginal costs.15
We write the marginal cost of production for a product as c(x), which is decreasing (x is a bad)
and convex (c′ < 0, c′′ > 0). The cost of gaming is denoted h(g), which is increasing and convex
(h′ > 0, h′′ > 0). The cost of gaming can include both real resource costs (e.g., engineering costs
to game the test) and the risk of regulatory penalty.
Policy intervention is motivated by a negative externality associated with x, which we assume
is linear and equal to φx. The regulator observes m, so policy must be based on m. In line with
our empirical application, we focus on a fuel economy regulation that requires that the (reported)
attribute be below a threshold: σ: m = x− g ≤ σ. We will use λ to denote the shadow price of the
regulation per unit ; i.e., the constraint on the firm’s profit function is written λ× (σ− x+ g)×D.
We later discuss an alternative policy that raises the price of fuel.
3.2 Summary of seller behavior
The monopoly seller chooses p, x and g to maximize profits, given the demand system, the degree
of buyer sophistication, and policy interventions. The firm’s Lagrangean is:
L = (p− c(x) + λ(σ − x+ g))D(p+ βx− (1− α)βg)− h(g). (3)
What values will the seller choose? Price will be chosen according to the standard optimal markup
formula for a monopolist that equates marginal revenue and marginal cost per unit sold (given the
profit-maximizing x and g).
The choice of x depends directly on policy. Absent policy (λ = 0), the seller will choose x so
that −c′(x) = β, which is privately efficient.16 The seller lowers x until the marginal cost of doing
15We model a single-product setting for clarity. The main drawback to this is that it does not directly represent
compliance that occurs through mix shifting—that is, shifting sales towards high efficiency models in order to meet
a fleetwide average rating—which is the focus of our simulations. The impact of mix shifting will manifest as a
set of price wedges for vehicles that operates similarly to the cost wedge modeled here. Our framework in general
is applicable to any compliance strategy as long as compliance requires changes in pricing or marginal costs away
from the firms’ privately optimal choices, whereas our model is not designed to capture the buyer welfare effects of
compliance methods that operate through fixed costs.
16The first-order condition for x is 0 = −c′(x)D + (p − c(x))βD′. Substituting in the optimal markup from the
first-order condition for price (p− c(x) = −D/D′) yields the result.
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so equals the marginal value of increased energy efficiency to the buyer. The seller makes this
privately efficient investment because any improvement in energy efficiency that is cost effective
allows them to raise prices.
When there is a binding policy, the seller will choose x to solve −c′(x) = β + λ. This is the
standard “internalization” of the externality suggested by the Pigouvian tradition. If there were
perfect compliance and there was no distortion to quantities sold due to market power, then the
first-best solution would be obtained by setting σ so that λ = φ.
The seller’s choice of gaming will depend on the cost function h(g). Specifically, the seller’s
choice will satisfy h′(g) = λD− (p− c)(1−α)βD′. This equates the marginal cost of gaming to the
marginal benefit, which includes a regulatory benefit (λD) and a benefit from shifting out demand,
which is equal to the markup (p− c) times the shift in demand due to gaming (1− α)βD′.
3.3 Absent policy, gaming lowers buyer surplus
Our main interest is in establishing how gaming affects buyer welfare in this setting. We show how
the firm alters its choice of p and x for any given level of g, which allows us to then characterize
buyer surplus. The optimal degree of gaming will depend on the regulatory punishment function,
so this exercise can be thought of as examining how shifts in the punishment function that alter
the equilibrium g will influence buyer surplus.
In our analysis we focus on buyer surplus, rather than full social welfare, because we believe it
is the incidence of gaming about which there is an interesting theoretical question. If the policy is
set optimally, gaming obviously lowers total social welfare, once buyer surplus, seller surplus and
the externality are taken into account. This is true by definition. Accordingly, we use the term
“buyer surplus” to denote the private benefits, abstracting from the externality, rather than the
more encompassing term of consumer surplus.
Our first proposition shows that, when there are no corrective policies, an increase in gaming
hurts buyers. (All proofs are in Appendix A.3.)
Proposition 1. In the absence of a binding policy (λ = 0), buyer surplus falls with the level of
gaming. Specifically:
dBS
dg
≈ − ρ(1− α)βD︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2β2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
≤ 0.
The effect of gaming on buyer surplus has two components. The first is a price effect. Gaming
lowers perceived fuel costs of the product, which shifts out demand by the perceived reduction in
full price, equal to −(1 − α)β.17 The seller responds to this demand shift by raising prices. How
much prices rise depends on the pass-through rate, which we denote ρ.18 The pass through rate
17Note that gaming does not affect the choice of x, which satisfies −c′(x) = β.
18For a monopoly seller, ρ = (1 + (D − 1)/S + 1/ms)−1, where  is the elasticity of demand D, supply S and
the inverse of the marginal surplus curve ms. Under another form of competition, the price effect will have the same
formula but the pass-through rate will have a different functional form (Weyl and Fabinger 2013).
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is typically used to describe how the burden of a tax is shared between buyers and sellers. An
increase in gaming affects a shift in perceived demand that functions exactly like a tax to buyers,
hence the analogy. This price effect is unambiguously bad for buyer surplus because the shift out
in demand was a mistake—the buyer still has to pay the true operating cost of the vehicle, which
is unchanged, but the seller has taken advantage of the mistake to raise prices.
The second effect on buyers of gaming is what we call the choice distortion. The buyer mis-
perceives the true full cost f of the product due to gaming and thus purchases too much of the
good given its true ownership cost. This misoptimization creates deadweight loss that is directly
analogous to a Harberger triangle. Its width is the difference in demand, at the final price, induced
by the gaming: D(p + βx − (1 − α)βg) − D(p + βx). Its height is the perceived gap in fuel cost
induced by gaming: (1 − α)βg. The term that appears in Proposition 1 is the derivative of this
distortionary triangle. It is zero when g = 0; it is rising with the square of the distortionary wedge;
and it is larger when demand is more elastic.
Both the price effect and the choice distortion unambiguously hurt buyers who are fooled by
gaming. The perceived improvement in the product causes sellers to raise prices, and the buyers
buy too much of the good. When buyers are fully sophisticated (α = 1), gaming causes no change
in buyer surplus; both terms go to zero. Both effects are larger when the degree of misperception
(1−α) is larger. The price effect scales with the level of demand. The choice distortion scales with
the slope of demand.
3.4 With a regulation, gaming can raise buyer surplus
Now suppose that there is a binding regulation (λ > 0). Proposition 2 shows that the regulation
(potentially) flips the sign of the price effect, so that buyers may in fact benefit from gaming, even
when they are fooled by it.
Proposition 2. In the presence of a binding standard (λ > 0), a change in gaming affects buyer
surplus as follows:
dBS
dg
≈ (−ρ(c′ − αβ)− β)D︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2β2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
.
As in the case with no regulation, the effect of gaming on buyer surplus includes a price effect and
a choice distortion. The choice distortion formula is not affected by the policy, it is the same as in
Proposition 1 and is unambiguously negative (lowers buyer surplus).
The price effect, however, is significantly altered by the externality-correcting regulation and
may be positive. Gaming causes three effects that determine the full price (p+βx). First, the seller
will use an increase in g to reduce x under a binding standard (i.e., dx = dg because σ = x−g when
the standard binds). This raises the true full cost of ownership by −β per unit sold. Second, true
cost of production falls by amount c′(x). Some of this cost savings—equal to ρc′—will be passed
through to buyers via a reduction in p. Third, buyers will perceive a change in operating cost. This
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shifts in demand, and the seller will adjust p accordingly in reaction to the perceived operating cost
increase. Specifically, with dx = dg, the buyer will perceive an operating cost change of αβ > 0, of
which ραβ will be finally born by buyers.
The sign of the full price effect is ambiguous. The term −ρ(c′ − αβ) is positive (it raises buyer
surplus), but it may or may not be larger than the rise in true costs (equal to β), which lowers
buyer surplus. When the price effect is positive (buyers gain), it may be larger than the negative
choice distortion, so that gaming benefits buyers. Intuitively, the benefit to buyers of gaming comes
because the seller experiences a cost reduction when they avoid the costly regulation. By definition
of a binding standard, the standard forces x to move away from the privately efficient level, so
gaming provides a private welfare gain by allowing the seller to move back towards that level. Even
if buyers are unaware of the firm’s gaming, they will enjoy some of the cost savings due to standard
pass through forces.
Several key comparative statics that we return to in our simulation analysis are apparent from
Proposition 2. Empirically, we are particularly interested in establishing conditions under which
buyers are likely to benefit from gaming. Factors that influence this outcome include the following:
1. More sophisticated (higher α) buyers gain more (or lose less) from gaming.
2. Tighter standards (higher λ) imply larger buyer gains (or smaller losses) from price effects.
3. More gaming (higher g) implies smaller gains (or larger losses).
On the first point, more sophisticated buyers experience smaller choice distortions, and they
will also get more favorable price effects.
On the second point, for a given amount of gaming, price effects get more positive (favorable
to buyers) under a tighter standard because gaming creates a larger cost savings. For a sufficiently
tight standard, the price effect will always be positive. This is true even if buyers are fully unaware
of gaming.
On the third point, for a given standard, the shadow price of the regulation is falling as gaming
increases by concavity of the profit function. In contrast, the choice distortion is rising in gaming,
because the total choice distortion is a function of the square of g.
To recap, under a binding standard, gaming induces a price effect of ambiguous sign, and a
choice distortion that lowers buyer surplus. When choice distortions are sufficiently small, positive
price effects can dominate, so that increases in gaming raise buyer surplus, even when the buyers
are fooled by the gaming. In the final part of the paper, we conduct calibrated simulations of the
European vehicle market to show that it is indeed likely that car buyers experienced net benefits
from gaming, even if they were completely fooled by it.
3.5 With a fuel tax, gaming lowers buyer surplus
Above we considered a fuel economy regulation, which is the most important carbon policy for
automobiles in the EU, as well as the United States, China and Japan. A regulation of this type is
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theoretically identical to a revenue-neutral set of product taxes (sometimes called a feebate) that
is linear in the fuel consumption rating. Thus, our results can be interpreted as informing the
analysis of either a feebate or a regulation. An alternative policy is a tax on motor fuels. In our
model, a fuel tax simply raises β, which is the term that translates fuel consumption ratings into
present-discounted value, so it is straightforward to show how a fuel tax will impact buyer surplus.
Proposition 3 shows that under a fuel tax, denoted as τ , that raises the lifetime operating cost
of the vehicle to f = p+ (β + τ)x, an increase in gaming unambiguously lowers buyer surplus.
Proposition 3. In the presence of a fuel tax but not a binding standard (λ = 0, τ > 0), buyer
surplus falls with the level of gaming. Specifically:
dBS
dg
≈ − ρ(1− α)(β + τ)D︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2(β + τ)2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
≤ 0.
When the planner uses the fuel price instrument instead of the regulation, the benefits of gaming
no longer accrue to buyers in the same way as under a standard. Gaming does not help the buyer
avoid the fuel tax τ , so it provides them no benefits. Unlike the case of a binding standard, gaming
under the fuel tax operates just like gaming in the case of no regulation. The only difference is
that β has been raised by policy.
Normally, the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant to its ultimate economic incidence; i.e.,
it does not matter if a retail sales tax is levied on buyers or sellers. But, this irrelevance need not
hold when there are opportunities for avoiding or evading the tax (Slemrod 2008, Kopczuk et al.
2016). Our result here is a manifestation of this same result. In our model, a regulation σ creates
a shadow price λ that corrects the externality associated with x. A tax τ does exactly the same
thing. If there were no evasion, the two policies would be identical whenever τ = λ, but gaming
offers an opportunity to avoid a regulation but not a fuel tax, which breaks the symmetry and
provides an enforcement rationale for preferring the tax over a regulation.
3.6 The environmental consequences of gaming
Theoretically, we are focused on the question of the incidence of gaming, but it is worth returning
now to a discussion of the externality. The environmental impact of gaming depends upon the
degree to which the planner adjusts policy to account for gaming, as well as the magnitude of what
we call the mechanical and market size effects. For a given standard, gaming has a mechanical
effect on pollution—gaming substitutes one for one for emissions reductions. Less obvious is the
potential market size effect. If buyers are fooled by gaming, then gaming may lower the perceived
price and the total market size will increase, which also increases pollution.19
19Note that, in the presence of market power, pollution increases due to an expansion of the market may not be
welfare decreasing, in the spirit of Buchanan (1969).
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This market size effect means that, on net, the introduction of a policy could increase pollution.
For example, let xb be the equilibrium attribute absent policy. A planner introduces a binding
standard σ < xb. Suppose that the firm complies exclusively through gaming. If buyers are partially
na¨ıve, they will perceive an improvement in the product. The net effect will be a perceived price
reduction compared to the baseline, which leads to larger total demand than in the pre-policy
baseline. Because the true attribute is unchanged from the baseline, the market expansion implies
an unambiguous total increase in pollution due, caused by the policy.
Given the extensive degree of gaming in the European vehicle market, this scenario is not
necessarily far fetched. Moreover, it is highly concerning for international climate negotiations that
are structured like the Paris Accord, under which there may be considerable pressure for individual
nations to deliver carbon reductions “on paper” that they do not actually wish to enforce. If lax
enforcement leads to inflate energy efficiency statistics that partially fool buyers into perceiving
cheaper durable goods, then this could act to raise total emissions.
Suppose instead that a regulator really does wish to lower emissions and is aware of gaming.
If both the planner and buyers are aware of the degree of gaming, then the planner can simply
ratchet down the standard to achieve the true desired level of emissions, accounting for gaming. In
this case, gaming will still occur, but there is no choice distortion and the only inefficiency comes
from resources spent to game, embodied in h(g). To the extent that these are real resource costs,
this is a social waste, but much of h(g) may represent regulatory risk.
More interesting then is the case when the planner is aware of gaming, but buyers have less
than perfect sophistication (α < 1). In this case, the regulator can ratchet down the standard in
order to achieve the desired level of pollution. But, following the logic of Goodhart’s Law, where
tighter standards induce more gaming, tighter policies will induce a larger choice distortion. The
choice distortion raises the social marginal cost of abating pollution, which will lead the regulator
to attenuate the second-best policy away from the Pigouvian benchmark, under which the standard
is tightened until λ equals marginal damages per unit of x.
4 Calibration of the incidence of gaming
To quantify the effects of gaming, we estimate a discrete choice model for new vehicles in order
to obtain the taste parameters of consumers. We show that there is a direct analog to the choice
distortion and price effects identified by our theory that can be decomposed from the standard log-
sum welfare formula for discrete choice models. Given this decomposition and the estimated taste
parameters, we calibrate outcomes under various assumptions about consumer awareness, policy
stringency, and the degree of gaming. This allows us to show comparative statics that illustrate
how the incidence of gaming depends on key parameters. We use parameters informed by the actual
market context, but we stress that we show results for a range of parameters to illustrate how the
incidence of gaming depends on these values.
Our theory describes a monopolist, but our simulation is broader and considers a multi-firm,
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multi-product setting. The main insights regarding the price effects are similar in either case, but
with multiple products the choice distortion comes both from switches between products and from
changes in the overall size of the market; that is, from the outside good. The final step of our
simulation relates to competition and gaming. We show that regulation increases pressure on firms
to game in this setting.
4.1 Setup and parameter choice
Buyer preferences: We begin by modeling the choice of a consumer making a discrete choice
about which vehicle to buy. Each consumer i chooses the vehicle that maximizes her indirect utility,
which we write as:
uij = ∆jγi − ηpj + βi(κj ∗ xj) + ξj + εij ,
where ∆j is a vector of vehicle characteristics, pj is price divided by income and κj ∗ xj is the
operating cost of the vehicle for driver i, measured as fuel consumption transformed into euros
per kilometer using fuel prices κj .
20 Utility from the outside good (not buying a new vehicle) is
normalized to zero, ui0 = εi0. We estimate a random coefficient logit model and assume that βi
and γi are independently normally distributed. We estimate the mean and standard deviation of
βi and γi. All remaining consumer heterogeneity is contained in the additive idiosyncratic error
term εij . The ξj term represents the value of product attributes unobserved by the researcher but
observed by firms and consumers. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we integrate out
εij to construct choice probabilities. After inverting the choice probabilities to obtain ξj , we use a
GMM estimator to estimate the vector of taste parameters.
Our dataset, a panel containing sales, prices and characteristics for all new vehicle sales in seven
European countries between 1998-2011 allows us to estimate a rich demand model with flexible cross
price elasticities. We only use data from before 2008 to estimate demand, so that our estimates
come from a period in which the performance gap was stable. We thus assume variation in xj is
informative about actual fuel cost differences. Note that we assume that consumers have on average
a correct belief about future fuel costs before gaming is introduced.21 Estimated taste parameters
and standard errors are reported in appendix Table A.5. Price and fuel costs have the expected
negative effect on utility. The mean of the estimated own price elasticities is -5.45, in line with the
previous literature. In the appendix we detail the estimation procedure, which is very similar to
the model estimated in Reynaert (2017).
Profits: In the empirical analysis we consider the impact of gaming with and without policy. The
Lagrangean that the firm faces is equivalent to the one defined in (3) but firms optimize profits
20Notice there is a slight change of notation relative to the theory: here β captures the willingness to pay for
fuel costs while in the theory β captures both the willingness to pay for fuel cost as well as the rescaling of fuel
consumption into money. In the demand estimation we rescale fuel costs using observed fuel prices κj .
21If there were undervaluation of fuel costs, gaming could mitigate internality costs as described in Allcott and
Wozny (2014), and as modeled in Allcott and Taubinsky (2015).
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taking the products in their portfolio as given. Firms thus maximize profits by choosing price (for
the vehicles they produce), taking levels of x as given:
max
p
∑
j∈F
[(pj − cj)qj(p, g)]
s.t.
∑
j∈F
qj · (xj − gj)/
∑
j∈F
qj = σ
in which F is the set of products a firm produces and qj is quantity demanded, which depends on
the full vectors of prices and gaming. Marginal costs cj are not observed in the data. Because we
estimate demand in a period where there is no regulation we are able to back out marginal costs
from the unconstrained first order conditions. Given these marginal costs and estimated preferences
we solve for new equilibrium prices with different levels of g and σ as we explain now.
The policy, as stated in the constraint, is a requirement for each firm to decrease its sales-
weighted emissions and mimics the EU policy.22 When there is a binding policy, selling polluting
products makes it harder for the firm to comply. Firms thus must adjust their price schedules in
order to reach the target. When we introduce gaming, these changes will be lowered because gaming
makes the constraint less binding (it lowers the policy wedge λ). Gaming also affects demand and
optimal prices directly when consumers are at least partly fooled because the demand shifts out in
response to perceived higher quality.
Policy target and abatement cost: We model the policy as a requirement for each firm to
decrease its sales-weighted emissions by 5%. This 5% is a limited decrease but it mimics a situation
in which firms can potentially comply without changing characteristics of vehicles. We model
honest compliance as sales mixing, such that firms comply by changing prices to shift their sales to
efficient vehicles in order to become compliant. The median price change is substantial, at e1860.
This policy would be optimal, given a sales mixing compliance strategy, if the externality from a
ton of carbon was e286. In the simulations, we also model more and less stringent policies that
mandate 3% and 10% reductions.
Our results are representative of any setting where a firm is distorted from its optimal pricing
because of a policy wedge. The same mechanisms are at play if there were emissions-based vehicle
taxes (paid at the moment of purchase), feebates or technology adoption requirements. In the longer
run, and when policy targets become more demanding, we expect firms to resort to technology
adoption or downsizing of the fleet to comply. These mechanisms not only increase the marginal
costs of vehicles, but also come with fixed costs. See Reynaert (2017) for a comparison of the welfare
effects of different abatement strategies. Here, we focus on understanding the determinants of the
incidence of gaming with sales-mixing as the benchmark for honest compliance. When we lower
22We use the actual formula used by the EU in its emission standard, so that the policy is based on vehicle weight.
For each firm we compute a sales weighted average emission rate, with emissions for heavier (lighter) cars receiving a
bonus (penalty) in the weighted sum. Specifically, the emissions rating of each vehicle j in the weighted sum receives
a penalty of 0.046 ∗ (weightj − 1370) where weight is measured in kilograms.
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the stringency of the policy, the policy wedge decreases. This mimics the setting where compliance
becomes cheaper for firms in the longer run.
Level of gaming: We model 5% gaming as a way to describe what the effects are of gaming
when it completely offsets the policy. When we introduce gaming, firms that game can meet the
policy requirement without a sales shift. In our simulations we also show what happens to buyer
welfare when gaming is lower or higher than the policy target. Consistent with media coverage of
the EU case, our procedure assumes that gaming is a fixed cost: it does not shift the marginal
costs of the products. Buyers will perceive fuel costs as lower so that demand shifts out and prices
increase. The market equilibrium will thus change to the extent that consumer demand, and hence
prices and quantities, shift in response to gaming. Our procedure estimates the equilibrium prices
and market shares for different levels of gaming, but it does not attempt to describe the optimal
amount of gaming (this would require information on the costs of gaming). Rather, our goal is
to use our demand system estimates to determine whether or not the price effects from gaming
could plausibly dominate the choice distortion, leading to increases in consumer welfare even when
consumers are na¨ıve, and how this result hinges on the existence of a policy.
Consumer awareness: A crucial parameter is consumer awareness α. When consumers are fully
aware of gaming our model collapses to a simple setting where regulatory avoidance benefits both
buyers and sellers. In our empirical setting it is unlikely that consumers were aware of the full
extent of gaming, but it is also unlikely that consumers did not update their beliefs over time.
A recent literature (see Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer 2013, Allcott and Wozny 2014, Sallee,
West, and Fan 2016, Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven Forthcoming) has shown that buyers do
take fuel consumption ratings into account when purchasing a vehicle. In a field experiment Allcott
and Knittel (2017) show that treating buyers with detailed information about fuel consumption
has no impact on their choice. In sum, this research suggests that consumers are well informed
about fuel consumption and value savings in future consumption when choosing between alternative
engines. However, in our setting buyers are confronted with very rapid declines in the information
content of reported fuel consumption due to gaming.
Might consumers have been informed by the media? A news search suggests that the first
reports about gaming appeared in the fall of 2013 in Germany. In other countries we find that the
first newspaper articles appear only in 2014, by which time we estimate a fuel consumption gap
in excess of 40%.23 In 2015 there is a major news episode related to the Volkswagen crisis. This
suggests that there was not EU-wide media coverage of the performance gap until 2015.
One other source of information are websites where consumers upload information about their
experienced fuel consumption. Several such website exist during this time period. We note, however,
that our empirical results demonstrate that there is significant heterogeneity across trips and drivers
23In particular, we perform a Google news search with the words “ICCT” and “gap” in German, English and
Dutch. The ICCT reports were discussed in the German media in 2013 and 2014, but we find no references in other
languages, except for two automobile websites in English. Other word combinations gave no additional results.
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in experienced fuel consumption due to driving conditions. This makes it difficult for consumers
to distinguish legitimate variation from gaming without a large sample. Thus, we conclude that
consumers might have had some information, but the available information was far from perfect.
We have tried to directly estimate consumer awareness of gaming with our data, but did not
find statistically meaningful results. The challenge is that our estimate of on-road consumption is
a function of gaming and selection, and the lack of heterogeneity in gaming across models within a
year (as shown in Figure 4) makes it difficult to isolate meaningful variation between vehicles that
can be used to explain market shares.24
In what follows we show how the price effect and choice distortion vary when consumers range
from completely na¨ıve to fully sophisticated (α ranges from 0 to 1). We argue that in the long term
buyers will update their beliefs, but in the short term consumers may be distorted in their choices
by gaming.
Buyer surplus To compute buyer welfare when consumers are affected by gaming (α < 1, in
terms of our theory) we follow Dubois, Griffith, and O’Connell (2018), who describe the welfare
effects of persuasive advertising. As described in Section 3, gaming changes prices, as firms will
exploit higher demand from lower perceived fuel costs. We label the equilibrium price without
gaming p0j , and the prices with gaming as p
1
j . The misperception of gamed fuel costs also distorts
consumer choice. To separate the two effects we make a distinction between decision (at the moment
of purchase) and experience utility (at the moment of utilization).25 When there is gaming, a na¨ıve
consumer will perceive fuel costs, following her belief, as x˜j = xj − gj , in which gj is the increase in
gaming. The consumer will make her choice based on x˜j and will perceive her decision as yielding
a utility of:
V˜ij(g, p
1) = ∆jγi − ηp1j + βix˜j + ξj + εij .
After purchasing the vehicle, true fuel costs are revealed, and the consumer has experience utility:
Vij(g, p
1) = ∆jγi − ηp1j + βixj + ξj + εij .
The difference between decision and experience utility is the optimization error, which in this case
is the value of the additional fuel costs for the consumer βi(xj − x˜j) = βigj . Buyer surplus with
24In particular, we did the following. We regressed our vehicle level gap estimates on a set of explanatory variables
and predicted gaps for vehicles in the choice set for which we have no on-road estimates. We then tested if differences
in gaps explain differences in market shares by introducing the estimated gaps in our discrete choice framework.
This resulted in very noisy estimates with a wide confidence interval for the effect of the gap on sales. In a second
stage, we tried to control for selection, using the assumption that gaming is absent prior to 2007. This allows us to
decompose the gaps post 2007 into gaps from driver selection and gaming. When we introduce this measure in the
discrete choice framework we find no statistically (or economically) meaningful estimates. One key limitation is that
our sales data end in 2011, which excludes the period of greatest interest. A related exercise that tests for changes
in pricing due to gaming similarly yielded only noisy results. We thus cannot make any statistical statement about
consumer awareness of gaming based on our data.
25This is conceptually the same as the choice distortion described in Allcott (2013) and Sallee (2014) who study
misperception of fuel costs, but our approach here is more general because we allow firms to change prices in response
to gaming. Leggett (2002) also models a similar distortion in a discrete choice setting.
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gaming can then be written as:
W˜i(g, p
1) = Eε[V˜ij ]− Eε[βgj ]
= Wi(g, p
1)−
∑
j
[sijβgj ],
where sij are the choice probabilities obtained from maximizing the decision utility. We compute
Wi(g, p
1) by applying the log-sum formula of Small and Rosen (1981). We can then decompose
the change from the equilibrium with honesty (0, p0) to the equilibrium with gaming (g, p1) into a
price effect and choice distortion:
Wi(0, p
0)− W˜i(g, p1) = Wi(0, p1)− W˜i(g, p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Choice Distortion
+Wi(0, p
0)−Wi(0, p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price Effect
.
When there is no policy the reference prices p0 are the observed prices in the market. When we
introduce gaming without policy, prices p1 will be higher than p0 because of market power. When
we introduce the policy, the reference prices p0 become the prices obtained from honest compliance
to the policy. These prices will differ from the no-policy reference prices because of the tax wedge
that the policy introduces (λ > 0). When we introduce gaming, the prices p1 will change for two
reasons: gaming lowers the tax wedge and firms with market power increase prices when gaming.
In contrast, the choice distortion will be similar with and without policy as it is not a function of
the tax wedge.
Note that consumer choice is distorted by gaming even when all products are gamed an identical
amount. Intuitively, a uniform reduction in fuel costs is akin to a reduction in the coefficient on fuel
costs in the utility function. Thus, when all firms game and perceived fuel costs drop, consumers
will, to some degree, reorder their favored products because they effectively put more weight on
other vehicle characteristics.26
Procedure: In all simulations, we start with a base market, which is the observed market in the
Netherlands in 2007. That is, we use several markets over several years to estimate the demand
system, but we need to choose one particular market as our baseline from which to calculate
changes. We compute consumer surplus from this observed market and our parameter estimates.
To simulate gaming, we first lower the perceived fuel cost of the products made by firms that game.
Second, with these new fuel costs, we solve for demand and prices using the first-order conditions
for profit maximization. Third, we compute changes in welfare relative to the reference market with
prices p0. The obtained changes in welfare are the changes in yearly utility, profits and emissions
from new vehicle sales.
26Note that we limit ourselves to reporting changes in consumer welfare from purchasing a new vehicle. We do
not consider effects on the second hand market or on the amount that consumers drive. Consumers could potentially
react to gaming by changing the amount they choose to drive in the purchased vehicle, a potential effect that we also
abstract from.
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4.2 Incidence of gaming
In this section we simulate the effect of gaming on buyer surplus and pollution. We start from a
base scenario in which we impose a policy of 5% that is responded to by 5% gaming. We focus first
on the role of consumer awareness before discussing policy stringency and the level of gaming.
Awareness: In Figure 5 we plot buyer welfare changes from 5% gaming when there is no binding
policy and when there is a 5% policy. When there is no policy both the choice distortion and the
price effect are negative: gaming hurts buyers. Both the choice distortion and the price effect go to
zero when consumer awareness α increases from 0 to 1. When we introduce the policy, the choice
distortion remains very similar and again goes to zero when consumer awareness increases. The
price effect, however, switches sign and becomes positive and an order of magnitude larger than
the choice distortion. This causes overall buyer surplus to increase with gaming. The intuition
for the switch in the price effect is cost avoidance of regulatory compliance that is passed through
from seller to buyer. Notice that this positive price effect is very similar regardless of consumer
awareness; pass through occurs whether or not consumers are fooled. The negative effects from
gaming via choice distortion increase when consumers are fooled, but even when consumers are
fully unaware of the gaming, the price effect strongly dominates.
Table 2 shows the effect of gaming on buyer surplus and pollution when consumers are unaware
(α=0). Column I is the no policy case, where we show the decrease in buyer surplus decomposed
into both a negative choice distortion and a negative price effect. Column II shows the expected
switch in sign of the price effect when a policy is in place. It shows that the price effect is an order
of magnitude larger than the choice distortion, so that buyer surplus increases with gaming under
a policy.
Table 2 also shows the effect of gaming on pollution. The first line shows the percentage-point
change in total sales, which captures how the size of the market changes as a result of gaming.
The second line shows the percentage change in average fuel consumption, which captures to what
extent buyers substitute toward more polluting vehicles as a result of gaming. When there is no
policy (Column I), we see that gaming increases the market size by 3% and that consumers buy
vehicles that are slightly more polluting (0.44%). When a policy is in place (Column II), these
effects increase considerably to a 4.5% increase in market size and a 5.8% increase in average fuel
consumption. The reason is that the reference point is honest compliance to the policy with a
target of 5% reduction in average fuel consumption. Not only does gaming undo the target (the
mechanical effect), but consumers also buy more vehicles and shift toward more polluting vehicles
when they are fooled by the gaming (the market size effect).
Proposition 2 in our theory showed that it was possible that consumers benefit from gaming,
even when they are fooled by it. Our simulation results suggest that this is indeed the case in
the European auto market. In line with Proposition 1, we find that consumers unambiguously
lose from gaming when there is no policy. But, this result is overturned with the introduction of a
policy. Consumers no longer benefit from honesty. Moreover, when choice distortions are significant,
28
Figure 5: Consumer awareness and incidence of gaming
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Figure plots buyer surplus, choice distortion and price effect in Euro when consumers range from unaware (α = 0) to
aware (α = 1). In panel (a) we model 5% gaming and no policy, in panel (b) we model 5% gaming with a 5% policy.
emissions actually rise in response to the policy, due to a combination of weak enforcement and
significant shifts in the market due to choice distortions. We believe this raises an important
concern for policies, like current international climate negotiations, that rely on voluntary on-paper
emissions pledges rather than effective and credible measurement.
Note, that in all scenarios in Table 2 consumers are unsophisticated and thus fooled by gaming.
As shown in Figure 5, this is the scenario in which negative effects of gaming are largest for
consumers. Evaluating the effects of gaming at α = 0 is thus conservative against finding positive
effects on buyer surplus.
Stringency of policy and level of gaming: In the second panel of Table 2 we vary the
stringency of the policy from 3% to 5% to 10%, while keeping the degree of gaming constant at 5%.
In all cases, the price effect is positive and larger than the choice distortion. The price effect is only
marginally larger than the choice distortion for the 3% target, but the price effect outweighs the
choice distortion by hundreds of euros when the standard becomes more stringent. This is in line
with the theory; the price effect is increasing with the stringency of the regulation. This is relevant
for assessing the EU standard, which is arguably the most demanding fuel consumption standard
in the world. Because it is very stringent, it is likely that price effects outweigh choice distortions
and lead to net consumer surplus gains.
Figure 6 shows buyer surplus and its decomposition when we increase the level of gaming from
0% to 10% in response to a 5% policy. The choice distortion hurts consumers more and more as
we increase gaming. The price effect is a parabola because of two off-setting effects. The curve
is steepest with the first units of gaming as these soften the burden of the policy the most. With
the following units of gaming, up until 5%, more and more of the policy is avoided but this gives
smaller incremental increases. At the same time higher gaming increases prices because of market
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Table 2: Effects of 5% Gaming on Buyer Surplus and Pollution
Base and Alternative Scenarios
Scenario: I II III IV
Policy: 0% 5% 5% 5%
Buyer Surplus (eper household)
Total BS -24.78 208.27 186.29 627.6
Choice Dist. -17.09 -16.72 -30.74 -8.6
Price Effect -7.7 224.99 217.04 636.2
Pollution (% change)
Sales 3.05 4.58 4.52 0.51
Emissions 0.44 5.82 6.19 5.68
Increasing Policy Stringency
Scenario: V VI VII VIII
Policy: 0% 3% 5% 10%
Buyer Surplus (eper household)
Total BS -24.78 33.19 208.27 608.74
Choice Dist. -17.09 -17.17 -16.72 -13.47
Price Effect -7.7 50.69 224.99 622.22
Pollution (% change)
Sales 3.05 1.83 4.58 8.25
Emissions 0.44 5.99 5.82 5.48
Table gives changes in buyer surplus and pollution from
gaming for unsophisticated consumers (α = 0). Top
panel: (I) 5% gaming when no policy is in place; (II)
5% gaming when a 5% policy is in place; (III) uniformly
distributed 0-10% gaming when a 5% policy is in place;
(VI) 5% gaming when a 5% policy is in place and when
outside good share is 10% instead of 61%. Bottom panel
increases the policy stringency from 0% to 10% while
keeping gaming constant at 5%. (Note that V=I and
VII=II.)
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Figure 6: Level of Gaming
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Figure plots buyer surplus, choice distortion and price effect in Euro when gaming ranges from 0% to 10% in response
to a 5% policy.
power. This effect becomes dominant once the policy is fully avoided and thus the price effect
decreases once more gaming is done than required to comply with the policy. The combination of
the decreasing choice distortion and parabolic price effect gives an overall buyer surplus that is also
parabolic. Note that gaming has positive effects on buyer surplus until 9%, almost twice the level
required to comply with policy.
In appendix Table A.6 we also show results when the policy is a fuel tax instead of a standard.27
This confirms that gaming with a fuel tax is harmful to buyers, consistent with Proposition 3. The
table shows results from fuel taxes that were found to produce the same change in fuel consumption
as the standards. We find that gaming decreases buyer surplus in very similar magnitudes to our
base specification when firms game in the absence of a policy. Buyers will not benefit from gaming
in response to a fuel tax because gaming will distort their choice; the price effect will lead them to
pay higher, not lower, prices for the vehicle; and gaming does nothing to help them avoid the fuel
tax. When they show up at the pump, they pay the tax per liter actually consumed, regardless of
the vehicle’s official rating.
Heterogeneity in Gaming and Outside Good: The choice distortion drives the negative
effects of gaming on buyer surplus and pollution. Because fuel consumption ratings are shaded
by the gaming, buyers purchase the wrong amount and the wrong type of vehicle. In Table 2
columns I-II and V-VIII, we see large increases in sales (between 1.8% and 8% points) and limited
increases in average fuel consumption per vehicle (between 0.4%-0.9% on top of the mechanical 5%).
Gaming thus leads to considerable changes in the size of the market and in the type of products
purchased. The size of these two effects, however, depends partly on two underlying assumptions in
27We also show results for a flat emission standard that is not attribute based. This flat standard is less demanding
for most firms and so the price effects are smaller, but still larger than the choice distortion
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our simulations: the lack of heterogeneity in gaming and the amount of substitution to the outside
good.
In Column III of Table 2 we relax the assumption of homogenous 5% gaming on all products and
instead draw gaming from the uniform distribution [0%, 10%], so that mean gaming is 5% as in the
main scenario. Now gaming not only reduces the importance of fuel consumption to choice relative
to other attributes, but also scrambles the ranking of preferred products more directly by providing
a bigger improvement to some products than to others. This has two implications relative to the
homogeneous 5% gaming in Column II. First, we see that the choice distortion almost doubles from
e17 to e31. Because gaming is heterogeneous, buyers buy the wrong type of cars in larger amounts
and end up further from their preferred vehicle. Nevertheless, despite the doubling of the choice
distortion, the price effect is still much larger as the pass through of regulatory avoidance is not
affected: on average products have 5% lower official fuel consumption so that the regulation is still
avoided. Second, the environmental damage due to gaming is larger and average emissions now
increase by 1.2T˙his is because consumers substitute more toward high quality and high pollution
vehicles that were gamed relatively more.
In Column IV we change the size of the outside good in our estimation and in our simulations.
The estimated demand parameters do not change significantly because we include market fixed
effects, but the results of the simulation do change noticeably. In Column II we obtained numbers
from a model in which we assume that one out of seven households are potentially interested
in purchasing a new car each year such that the outside good share is 61%. This assumption
determines the price elasticity of the industry. When we lower the price elasticity of industry by
decreasing the outside good share to 10%, we find significant changes. First, the positive price effects
increase significantly because buyers do not stop purchasing polluting vehicles even at much higher
prices. The price changes needed for firms to comply thus increase and the benefits of avoiding the
regulation are larger. Second, the choice distortion shrinks. Because the price elasticity of industry
is much lower now, buyers will not change their quantity drastically in response to the gaming.
This is also important for pollution. The size of the market increases by 0.5% instead of 4.5%
points, though buyers still substitute to more polluting vehicles on average. In sum, the positive
price effect increases and the choice distortion decreases when the outside good share shrinks.
4.3 Competition and gaming
So far we have assumed that the whole industry games, in line with the empirical evidence shown
in Section 2.5. Here, we study what happens if not all firms game. From the point of view of a
single firm, gaming confers a competitive advantage. This is much the same intuition as for the
monopolist; the residual demand curve faced by the firm can be shifted out by gaming. Conversely,
when other firms are gaming, an honest firm would be at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, we
expect competitive pressure to induce gaming, as was found in Becker and Milbourn (2011) and
Bennett, Pierce, Snyder, and Toffel (2013).
In Table 3 we compute market outcomes with asymmetry in gaming. In the left panel only one
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Table 3: Market changes from asymmetric gaming
Gaming Alone Not Gaming Along
No Policy Policy No Policy Policy
Consumer Surplus (eper household)
Total -3.83 15.79 -24.31 189.94
Choice Distortion -3.17 -3.24 -17.23 -16.79
Price Effect -0.66 19.20 -7.08 206.7
Changes in pollution
Total Sales (% point) 0.27 0.42 2.81 4.24
Emissions per vehicle % 0.04 0.62 0.41 5.45
Changes in Profits
Gamer/non gamer % 20.41 37.94 -9.86 -15.83
Column (1) and (3) give changes in market equilibrium when one firm games.
We present the average of letting each firm game (we run a separate simulation
per firm). Changes in profits are the average for the firms that game (not for
the industry). Column (2) and (4) give changes in market equilibrium when all
but one firm games. We run a separate simulations for each firm not gaming
along when all others game. Changes in profits are the average for the firms
that do not game along.
firm games, while all other firms remain honest. In the right panel, labeled “not gaming along,”
all but one firm games. We simulate these asymmetric cases separately for each firm and present
the average outcomes over these cases. In all scenarios we find results that are qualitatively similar
to our industry-wide symmetric gaming case in that gaming hurts buyers when there is no policy,
while buyers benefit from gaming under the policy. Buyer surplus and pollution effects are much
smaller when only one of the carmakers games. Effects are almost equal to symmetric gaming when
all but one firm games.
Table 3 also reports how profit changes with gaming. In the left panel we give the gains in
profits for the single firm that games (the gamer), in the right panel we present the losses in profits
for the single firm that does not game along (the non-gamer). The average gain from gaming
unilaterally is large: a 20% increase in profits, even in the absence of policy. But the profitability
from gaming rises still further, to 38%, with policy. This shows that firms have a very strong
incentive to unilaterally deviate from honesty, and this incentive rises with policy. The profit losses
from not “gaming along” are also large. Being the sole honest firm leads to a 10% decrease in
profits without policy and a 16% decrease with policy. Thus, if competitors start to game, it is
very costly not to follow along, and this incentive is enhanced by the policy.
We conclude that the policy thus clearly increases the incentive to game in a multi-firm context:
the unilateral profits from deviating from honesty increase and the costs from not deviating when
others do increases.28 This is related to an existing literature that asks whether competition induces
28Note that this setting is not necessarily a prisoner’s dilemma. The total industry profit from the price equilibrium
with gaming relative to the price equilibrium with honesty will depend on the total legal and regulatory costs of gaming
33
gaming (e.g., Becker and Milbourn 2011, Bennett et al. 2013), but we add to that the suggestion
that corrective policy amplifies these competitive effects.
5 Conclusion
This paper does three things. First, it documents a remarkable and growing divergence between
official and on-road fuel consumption rates, which we call the performance gap, in a reduced-form
empirical analysis using novel data. This performance gap is coincident with the introduction of
strict standards based on the official ratings, and we interpret this pattern as evidence of Goodhart’s
Law, whereby policy-induced stakes lead to the strategic manipulation of a measure. Combined
with the still-growing Volkswagen scandal regarding local air pollution, the performance gap in
carbon emissions points to a veritable crisis in the administration of environmental regulations
for automobiles. Moreover, combined with other findings that call into question the efficacy of
other energy efficiency policies (Davis, Fuchs, and Gertler 2014, Fowlie, Greenstone, and Wolfram
Forthcoming, Levinson 2016), we believe our findings point to a serious challenge for the future
of climate negotiations, which are now built upon bottom-up pledges based on unreliable ex ante
estimates of program conservation.
Second, we develop a theoretical framework in order to ask how such policy-induced gaming
of energy-efficiency ratings will impact buyers. The model points out how the existence of an
externality-correcting policy fundamentally alters the incidence of gaming on buyers. Absent policy,
gaming hurts consumers through both the price effect and choice distortion channels. But, when
gaming is done to avoid a regulation, consistent with Goodhart’s Law, then buyers can benefit via
pass through of cost savings. We show that beneficial price effects can dominate so that private
buyer surplus rises with gaming.
Third, we conduct a structural analysis and calibrated welfare simulation in order to quantify
the price effects and choice distortions identified by theory. For a wide range of parameter values,
we find that price effects do indeed dominate so that the theoretical result that consumers might
benefit from gaming is not just a curious possibility, but in fact appears to be a likely probability.
Our analysis emphasizes private buyer surplus, abstracting from the externality. Assuming that
the policies are optimally designed and the externality benefits accrue to buyers, the buyers would
be better off when the seller complies honestly, once the externality is taken into account. But, in
our empirical context, neither condition is likely to hold. Analysis of the fuel economy standards
in the US typically finds that the standards do not pass a cost-benefit test unless buyers, contrary
to recent empirical evidence, have large biases in their valuation of fuel economy. Moreover, the
climate benefits of reduced emissions largely accrue to future generations and to people other than
European car buyers.
We anticipate that the same concerns we highlight here are present in a variety of regulatory
settings, and we expect that both our theoretical and empirical approach can be applied elsewhere.
relative to the total costs of compliance. The evidence presented here shows that honesty becomes harder to support
when the policy is in place.
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Critical to our setup is that the measure which can be gamed is used by the regulator and is
instrumental to consumer choice. For example, in education, test scores of current students might
be gamed to satisfy policy mandates that affect resource transfers. The test scores also affect the
demand for admission from future waves of students. Consumers (students) can benefit from gaming
when gaming frees up resources at a school that would otherwise be expended to satisfy policy and
obtain transfers. Or, in finance, capital requirements can be used to minimize an individual bank’s
role in creating systemic risk. Customers can privately benefit if a bank is able to rebalance its
portfolio more profitably after gaming the regulated measures.
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A APPENDIX MATERIAL
A.1 Sample selection process:
Self-reported odometer readings are sometimes missing or clearly incorrect. We eliminate unreliable
data through a data selection process detailed here.
Our data selection process first eliminates a number of drivers (accounts) that have unreliable
information or too few observations. With the accounts that remain, we then consider several ways
to account for mismeasurement in odometer readings for individual transactions. Specifically, we
first limit the sample to gasoline- or diesel-fueled vehicles, which eliminates 6.7 million transactions.
Second, we drop vehicles that use the wrong type of fuel for their engine in more than 1% of the
visits, e.g., putting diesel fuel in a vehicle that is labeled as gasoline in our data. Inconsistencies
might be in the data because drivers use their card for a different vehicle, or these observations might
be mistakes in the assignment of vehicle type. This drops 7.5 million transactions. Third, we pose
some minimum requirements on the driving patterns of the drivers that produce the transactions.
We drop drivers that never report an increase of more than 150km in their odometer reading (2.5
million transactions).29 We drop car models with fewer than 10 drivers, and drivers with fewer than
10 fuel station visits (1.3 million transactions). We drop drivers that did not report driving more
than 5,000km in total or reported driving more than 500,000km in total (11.3 million). Having
isolated a set of drivers (accounts) with ample data, within those accounts we drop individual
transactions in two steps. First, we drop transactions where the odometer difference is lower than
100km or higher than 3000km (7.6 million). Second, we drop transactions that result in a fuel
consumption that is outside 1.25 times the interquartile range of estimated fuel consumption for
each car model in the data (5.1 million). This results in the final dataset of 24 million observations.
A.2 Empirical Bayes Correction of on-road ratings
We start by decomposing the total variance in the sample V ar(rnij) = σ
2
r into three components:
variance in performance of vehicles σ2j , drivers σ
2
i , and pump visits σ
2
n. We estimate the variance
between pump visits of the same driver as:
σ2n =
1
N − I
N∑
n
(rnij − rij)2,
in which rij is the mean fuel consumption of driver i, N is the total number of observations and I is
the total number of drivers. Next, we estimate the covariance between drivers of the same vehicles
as:
σ2j = cov(rij , rkj).
29Note that the range of a combustion engine is easily more than 800km.
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The estimated covariance is obtained as a weighted average of covariances between randomly sorted
pairs (i, k) of drivers of the same car. We weigh each pair of drivers (i, k) by the sum of their visits.
Finally, we obtain σ2i as the remaining variance: σ
2
i = σ
2
r −σ2n−σ2j . The precision of the estimated
gap for each driver is then defined as:
hi = 1/(σ
2
i + σ
2
n/ni),
so that drivers with a high number of visits have a higher precision. We obtain precision weighted
means per car as the weighted average of rij with hi as weights. Second we shrink these precision
weighted means with an estimate of their reliability:
ψj = σ
2
j /(σ
2
j + 1/
∑
i
hji),
where the reliability is defined as the signal σj over the total variance. We use the per vehicle
shrunken on-road estimates r̂j to construct an alternative estimate of the gap defined in (2) and to
inform us about the distribution of the gap between vehicles.
Table A.3 describes the variation in the on-road fuel consumption (σ2d) across release years, as
well as its decomposition across three components: variation across refueling transactions for the
same driver (σ2n), variation across drivers of the same vehicle (σ
2
i ) and variation across vehicles (σ
2
j ).
We decompose the variation separately for each release year and describe the mean and standard
deviation across release years in the table.
More than 25% of the variance is attributable to within driver variance. This variance is due to
driving conditions, stockpiling effects and errors in odometer reporting. We find that the variance
across drivers of the same car σ2i is 0.21. This is an economically large number; it means that the
on-road fuel consumption is estimated to be 0.28 liter/100km higher at the third quartile than at
the first quartile of drivers in the same car.30 A policy that would shift a driver from the third
quartile of the fuel consumption gap to the first quartile would decrease fuel consumption by 3%.
These numbers are interesting from a policy perspective as they give an indication of the extent
to which fuel consumption and emissions can be reduced by teaching and incentivizing drivers to
drive a vehicle more efficiently.31 The remaining part of the variance σ2j is the co-variance between
drivers of the same car and can be seen as the information available to estimate the car specific
component of on-road fuel consumption. We estimate this to be 1.35, which is more than 60% of
the total variance. Table A.3 also shows that the variance components are relatively stable over
time; each component has a low standard deviation across release years. There is variation in the
size of the fuel consumption gap between cars and between drivers, but this variation is stable
over time. Given this variance decomposition we turn next to the estimates of the distribution
30If we assume that conditional on car j, r has a normal distribution, the interquartile distance is 1.349*σ2i .
31Significant variation across drivers of identical cars is consistent with results reported in Langer and McRae
(2014), who analyze extremely detailed driving data from a few dozen drivers of an identical car, the Honda Accord.
In contrast, our data come from a large sample and cover many models.
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of rj and dj for each release year. Table A.4 reports the unweighted mean estimate of rj and r̂j ,
obtained with the empirical Bayes correction. The mean value of both rj and r̂j are decreasing
over the release years. In all years the corrected means are lower than the raw means, because on
average vehicles with high rj have less precise underlying data, but overall shrinkage and precision
weighting has small effects. The resulting gap d̂j is estimated to be an imprecise 10% up until
2006. From 2007 onwards we see a significant increase in the performance gap, consistent with the
previous estimates.
A.3 Proofs
Proposition 1. In the absence of policy (λ = 0), buyer surplus falls with the level of gaming.
Specifically:
dBS
dg
≈ − ρ(1− α)βD︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2β2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
≤ 0.
We derive this by starting with the definition of buyer surplus as the integral under the inverse
demand curve. Because the true attribute of the good x is unaffected by gaming, we can analyze
buyer surplus using the true demand curve. The standard portion of buyer surplus is the integral
from the final price, denoted p∗ up to infinity. Denote by p˜ the upfront purchase price that would
induce a sophisticated consumer to purchase the amount of the good that is in fact purchased
at price p∗ by the consumer with perception (1 − α). The choice distortion can be written as
the difference between the revenue generate between p∗ and p˜ and the consumer value generated
between those points.
BS =
∫ ∞
p∗
D(z + βx)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS of correct quantity
+
∫ p∗
p˜
D(z + βx)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of excess quantity
−
∫ p∗
p˜
D(p˜+ βx)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of excess quantity
. (A.1)
Differentiation of equation A.5, in which p∗ and p˜ are endogenously determined by g, yields
the result. Note that the inside of the third integral is a constant with respect to the variable of
integration, so it can be pulled out of the integral, leaving only the constant 1 inside. Specifically:
dBS
dg
= −D(p∗ + βx)dp
∗
dg
+
{
D(p∗ + βx)
dp∗
dg
−D(p˜+ βx)dp˜
dg
}
−
{
(p∗ − p˜)D′(p˜+ βx)dp˜
dg
+D(p˜+ βx)
(
dp∗
dg
− dp˜
dg
)}
. (A.2)
Using the pass through coefficient ρ, a change in g scales to a change in tax by (1 − α)β, so
dp∗/dg = ρ(1− α)β. This simplifies the first term to yield the result.
For the second term in A.2, note that p˜ = p∗− (1−α)βg by definition. Then, substitute a first-
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order Taylor approximation to write demand at p˜ as a function of demand at p∗ and D′× (p˜− p∗):
D(p∗ + βx)
dp∗
dg
−D(p˜+ βx)dp˜
dg
=D(p∗ + βx)
dp∗
dg
−D(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)dp˜
dg
≈{D(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg) +D′(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)(1− α)β} dp∗
dg
−D(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)dp˜
dg
=D(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)
(
dp∗
dg
− dp˜
dg
)
+D′(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)(1− α)βdp
∗
dg
(A.3)
Now consider the third term in A.2. After substituting p˜ = p∗− (1−α)βg, we see that the term
that multiplies the difference in derivatives will cancel in the third term of A.2 and the second-term,
defined using A.3. This means that A.2 can be written:
dBS
dg
= −D(p∗ + βx)ρ(1− α)β +D′(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)(1− α)βdp
∗
dg
−
{
(p∗ − p˜)D′(p˜+ βx)dp˜
dg
}
. (A.4)
Substitute p∗ − p˜ = (1− α)βg and dp˜/dg = (ρ− 1)(1− α)β, which follows from differentiating the
definition of p˜ and using the pass through result for p∗. Then, simplification yields the final result:
dBS
dg
= −D(p∗ + βx)ρ(1− α)β +D′(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)(1− α)βρ(1− α)β
− {(1− α)βgD′(p˜+ βx)(ρ− 1)(1− α)β}
= −D(p∗ + βx)ρ(1− α)β +D′(p∗ + βx− (1− α)βg)(1− α)2β2ρ
− (1− α)2β2gD′(p˜+ βx)(ρ− 1)
= −D(p∗ + βx)ρ(1− α)β + (1− α)2β2gD′(p˜+ βx).
Note that, with the local linear demand assumption, the derivative of D evaluated at either p˜ or
p∗ is the same. 
Proposition 2. In the presence of a binding standard (λ > 0), a change in gaming affects buyer
surplus as follows:
dBS
dg
≈ (−ρ(c′ − αβ)− β)D︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2β2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
.
Proposition 2 is derived in a similar way to Proposition 1, but we define surplus using integrals
over the demand function starting with full prices f . (This same could have been done in the prior
proof, yielding the same result.) Recall that f = p+ βx and f˜ = p+ βx− (1− α)βg.
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BS =
∫ ∞
f∗
D(z)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS of correct quantity
+
∫ f∗
f˜
D(z)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of excess quantity
−
∫ f∗
f˜
D(f˜)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of excess quantity
. (A.5)
Differentiating, using the same Taylor approximation as above to simplify, yields:
dBS
dg
≈ −D(f∗)df
∗
dg
+D′(f∗)(f∗ − f˜)
(
df∗
dg
− df˜
dg
)
.
Substitute the pass through result described in the text: df∗/dg = ρ(c′(x)+αβ)+β). Substitute
the definition of f˜ , which shows that f∗ − f˜ = (1− α)βg. And substitute df∗dg − df˜dg = (1− α)β:
dBS
dg
≈ −D(f∗)(ρ(c′(x) + αβ) + β) +D′(f∗) {(1− α)βg} {(1− α)β}
= −D(f∗)(ρ(c′(x) + αβ) + β) +D′(f∗)(1− α)2β2g. (A.6)
This yields the result. 
Proposition 3. In the presence of a fuel tax but not a binding standard (λ = 0, τ > 0), buyer
surplus falls with the level of gaming. Specifically:
dBS
dg
≈ − ρ(1− α)(β + τ)D︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (1− α)2(β + τ)2D′g︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice distortion
≤ 0.
Proposition 3 follows directly from Proposition 1 once it is recognized that this is the exact
same problem with β replaced by β + τ at all points. Thus, the exact same proof as Proposition 1
holds, yielding the result. 
A.4 Estimation Details
We estimate the parameters θ using the following GMM objective:
min
θ
ξjZ
′ωZξj
in which Z is a matrix of instruments and ω is a weighting matrix.
We use a panel containing sales, prices and characteristics for all new vehicle sales in seven
European countries between 1998 and 2007.32 We only use data from before 2008 to estimate
demand, so that our estimates come from a period in which the performance gap was stable.
We thus assume variation in xj is informative about actual fuel cost differences. The vector ∆j
32The seven countries are: Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.
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contains information on horsepower, weight, footprint (a measure of vehicle size), height and a
dummy specifying if the car is of a foreign brand (e.g., Fiat in France). Additionally, we include
fuel type by market dummies, dummies for the number of months a vehicle was on sale in a
country-year, country fixed effects, a linear time trend, body type fixed effects, vehicle class fixed
effects and brand fixed effects. We divide prices by income per capita in each country-year, so
that price sensitivity varies with income in the market. We need instruments for price and for the
standard deviations of the random coefficients. We instrument for prices using both cost shifters
and sums of characteristics instruments, which follows Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). The
sums of characteristics instruments are the sum of fuel costs, horsepower, weight, footprint and
height across all other products in the market and across all other products within the same firm in
the market. We also include the number of competing products and the number of products in the
same firm. The cost shifters are the log of labor costs in the country of production and a dummy
specifying if the vehicle is sold in the country of production. For the standard deviations, we use
approximately optimal instruments that are constructed using a two-step procedure as described in
Reynaert and Verboven (2014). We estimate considerable heterogeneity in the taste for horsepower,
weight and footprint. Vehicles perceived as foreign are less attractive for consumers. Cars with
four doors are preferred over cars with two doors.
A.5 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Mean St. Dev.
Car Characteristics
Fuel Consumption (L/100km) 6.65 1.73
Vehicle Weight in kg 1,354 245
Diesel Engines 0.46 0.50
Drivers per car 107 219
Driver Characteristics
Pump visits 134 80
Total liters purchased 6,015 3,666
Total distance (km) 111,726 53,942
Pump Visit Characteristics
Liters per visit 45.3 10.8
Odometer increase per visit 671 192
The table gives summary statistics for the 2,696 vehicles,
266,616 drivers and 23,989,576 pump visits in the sample.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics: Netherlands and Travelcard
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
TravelCard Netherlands
Price (euro) 31,672 13,367 40,767 29,676
Fuel Consumption (L/100km) 6.74 1.60 7.89 2.46
Vehicle Weight in kg 1,344 230 1,409 308
Diesel Engines 0.45 0.50 0.36 0.48
Summary statistics for the TravelCard sample and the full dutch market between
1998 and 2011.
Table A.3: Variance decomposition
σ2d σ
2
i σ
2
j σ
2
n
Mean 2.11 0.21 1.35 0.56
Standard deviation 0.57 0.03 0.45 0.11
Variance decomposition (%) 100 10.36 62.34 27.30
Standard deviation 2.54 6.76 4.40
σ2d is the total variance in rnij , σ
2
i is the variation attributable to
differences across individuals driving the same vehicle, σ2j is the co-
variance between drivers in the same vehicle, σ2n is the variation
across refueling visits of the same driver in the same vehicle. The
variance decomposition is performed separately for each release year,
and the mean and standard deviation across years are reported in
table.
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Table A.4: Estimated vehicle gaps by release year, with and without empirical Bayes correction
Release Unweighted rj r̂j Shrinkage d̂j
1998 7.91 7.87 0.99 7.85
(1.41) (1.39) (0.00) (7.82)
1999 7.90 7.88 0.99 8.70
(1.49) (1.46) (0.01) (6.90)
2000 7.96 7.94 0.99 8.60
(1.44) (1.43) (0.01) (7.36)
2001 7.73 7.72 0.99 11.15
(1.44) (1.41) (0.00) (7.12)
2002 7.63 7.60 0.99 11.02
(1.58) (1.57) (0.00) (9.17)
2003 7.83 7.80 0.99 11.01
(1.61) (1.56) (0.00) (9.18)
2004 8.31 8.29 0.99 9.52
(1.68) (1.64) (0.00) (9.58)
2005 7.87 7.82 0.99 12.56
(1.71) (1.59) (0.01) (9.14)
2006 8.10 8.06 0.99 12.55
(1.57) (1.53) (0.00) (8.17)
2007 7.71 7.68 0.99 17.66
(1.37) (1.34) (0.00) (9.67)
2008 7.46 7.45 0.99 17.57
(1.36) (1.34) (0.00) (9.00)
2009 7.24 7.21 0.99 22.34
(1.30) (1.28) (0.00) (10.07)
2010 7.15 7.13 0.99 26.38
(1.33) (1.32) (0.00) (10.68)
2011 6.92 6.90 0.99 29.74
(1.24) (1.21) (0.01) (10.29)
2012 6.64 6.62 0.99 37.46
(1.08) (1.06) (0.01) (11.05)
2013 6.23 6.23 0.99 44.23
(0.92) (0.89) (0.01) (11.34)
2014 6.18 6.15 0.98 52.90
(1.20) (1.13) (0.02) (12.04)
Table reports mean and standard deviations for the distribution
of estimated on-road consumption rj , Bayes corrected on-road
consumption r̂j , shrinkage factor and Bayes corrected efficiency
gap d̂j by release year.
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Table A.5: Estimation Results
Mean Taste St. Dev.
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
Price/Inc. -6.51 (0.45)
Fuel Cost -0.53 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03)
Horsepower 1.48 (0.21) 1.78 (0.10)
Weight 0.22 (0.21) 4.32 (0.16)
Footprint 0.88 (0.05) 0.58 (0.04)
Foreign -0.92 (0.03) 0.02 (0.16)
Height 0.02 (0.02)
Doors 0.50 (0.11)
The table shows estimated taste parameters from a random co-
efficient logit estimation on the the car market for seven EU
countries using data from 1998 to 2007. Taste distributions are
assumed to be normal, and mean and standard deviations are es-
timated for selected characteristics. Additional controls are fuel
type by market dummies, months for sale if less than 12, country
fixed effects, linear time trend, body type fixed effects, vehicle
class fixed effects and brand fixed effects. Model is estimated
using a two-step GMM using approximate optimal instruments
with sum of characteristics and cost shifter instruments for prices.
Table A.6: Consumer surplus changes from gaming under alternative policies
Policy Target
3% 5% 10%
Attribute-Based Standard
Total 33.19 208.27 608.74
Choice Distortion -17.77 -16.72 -13.47
Price Effect 50.96 224.99 622.22
Flat Standard
Total 3.92 107.93 398.69
Choice Distortion -17.58 -16.93 -15.01
Price Effect 21.50 124.86 413.70
Fuel Tax
Total -24.59 -24.94 -25.80
Choice Distortion -17.42 -17.66 -18.23
Price Effect -7.16 -7.29 -7.57
This Table presents consumer surplus changes when
there is industry wide 5% gaming and policies with
varying stringency: in Column (1) the target is a 3%
reduction in emissions, Column (2) a 5% reduction
(as in the previous Tables) and Column (3) a 10%
reduction. The first panel shows the consumer surplus
changes when firms game and there is an attribute-
based standard, the second panel shows the effect of
gaming when there is a flat standard, the third panel
shows the effect of gaming when the policy is a fuel
tax rather than a standard.
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